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I. INTRODUCTION
Many lawyers begin their initial meeting with a client by explaining,
“Everything between us is confidential.”2 Generally, lawyers believe
that this language will make the client trust the lawyer and encourage the
client to share confidential information.3 Nonetheless, this statement is a
lie. The legal and ethical rules governing lawyers make some exceptions
to confidentiality mandatory and others discretionary.4 Moreover, the
utility of pledging absolute confidentiality is questionable. First, clients
are generally familiar with the concept of lawyer-client confidentiality
from other experiences with lawyers or from popular culture,5 and many
clients already (mistakenly) think confidentiality is absolute.6 Second,
empirical evidence does not support the assumption that clients rely on a
guarantee of absolute confidentiality when they decide whether to be
candid with their lawyers.7 Third, pledging absolute confidentiality creates
the potential for betraying clients’ trust if lawyers later determine that
they must disclose their clients’ confidences without having explained
the bounds of confidentiality in the first place.
Commentators have offered alternatives to promising absolute
confidentiality. Some seek to make the representation an honest one.
They urge lawyers to promise not to exercise their discretion to disclose
certain confidences, or even to pledge to commit civil disobedience
when legal obligations would require disclosure if lawyers are going to
commit themselves to absolute confidentiality. Other commentators
suggest that lawyers provide clients with a very general reference to the
existence of exceptions to confidentiality under the rules. A last group
of commentators urges a very detailed description of these exceptions.
This Article offers an alternative dialogue approach. Rather than view
the issue of explaining confidentiality either as a strategy for gaining

2. See infra text accompanying notes 45, 52–53.
3. See infra notes 56–59, 71 and accompanying text.
4. See infra Part II.A.
5. See infra note 49 and accompanying text; see also 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR.
ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 9.2, at 9-6 (3d ed. 2010) (“[A]lthough the public does
not have a good grasp of the intricacies of the [confidentiality] rule, it has a keen
awareness that confidentiality . . . is at the heart of the [lawyer-client] relationship.”).
6. See infra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 73, 79–86 and accompanying text.
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client trust or an obligation necessary to comply with certain legal
obligations, we propose understanding it as a key element in creating a
relationship of dialogue grounded in honesty and mutual respect.
In doing so, we build on the work of the late Fred Zacharias, whose
scholarship in this area provides both pathbreaking empirical insights
and unwavering commitment to respecting client dignity.8 Among
Zacharias’s contributions are his oft-cited empirical study suggesting
that lawyers wrongly assume that clients would not share confidential
information if clients accurately understood that exceptions to
confidentiality exist and his analytic insight that lawyers’ claim to
mislead clients for their own good reveals a deep distrust of clients’
capacity to participate in dialogue with the lawyer.9 Zacharias viewed
this perspective as reprehensible disregard for the client’s basic human
dignity.10 Although his two articles on Rethinking Confidentiality are
most on point, these concerns are evident throughout the exceptional
body of work he contributed to professional responsibility scholarship.11
8. See Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351 (1989).
9. See id. at 386–88.
10. Zacharias astutely described the “trade-off between misleading clients and
encouraging disclosure for their own good,” and in response to his own empirical study,
he concluded:
Nevertheless, if conscious considerations drive lawyers’ willingness to deceive
clients, they undermine confidentiality’s autonomy rationale. Lawyers hardly
enhance client “dignity” as self-determinative individuals by hiding the truth from
them. Exaggerating confidentiality’s scope may induce clients to trust their lawyers,
but it is not a healthy basis for the trust. Rather, it represents a calculated decision
to encourage an inappropriate overreliance upon the lawyers’ services.
If subsequently discovered, that decision jeopardizes rather than enhances effective
representation.
Id. at 387.
11. See id.; Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality II: Is Confidentiality
Constitutional?, 75 IOWA L. REV. 601, 641–42 (1990) [hereinafter Zacharias, Rethinking
Confidentiality II]; see also Fred C. Zacharias, Coercing Clients: Can Lawyer Gatekeeper
Rules Work?, 47 B.C. L. REV. 455, 480 (2006) [hereinafter Zacharias, Coercing Clients];
Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335, 357–65 (1994); Fred
C. Zacharias, Harmonizing Privilege and Confidentiality, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 69, 75–77,
93–96, 108–09 (1999) [hereinafter Zacharias, Harmonizing Privilege and Confidentiality];
Fred C. Zacharias, Integrity Ethics, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 541, 553–65, 586 (2009)
[hereinafter Zacharias, Integrity Ethics]; Fred C. Zacharias, Limited Performance Agreements:
Should Clients Get What They Pay For?, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 915, 941 n.137 (1998)
[hereinafter Zacharias, Limited Performance Agreements]; Fred C. Zacharias, Limits on
Client Autonomy in Legal Ethics Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 199, 211 (2001)
[hereinafter Zacharias, Limits on Client Autonomy in Legal Ethics Regulation]; Fred C.
Zacharias, Professional Responsibility, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, and Preventive Law,
5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 909, 915–16 (1999) [hereinafter Zacharias, Professional
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We also acknowledge our debt to Clark Cunningham, whose article
How To Explain Confidentiality?12 is the model for our effort to
investigate lawyer-client conversations regarding confidentiality and to
categorize commentators’ approaches to explaining confidentiality, and
the inspiration for us to offer our own dialogue approach. Although we
do propose a framework for explaining confidentiality, we remain
mindful of Cunningham’s advice that offering a “set of ‘how to’
directions” poses the danger of undervaluing the profound difficulty of
the task.13
In Part II, the Article explains the mandatory and discretionary
exceptions to confidentiality under the duty of confidentiality and the
attorney-client privilege,14 examines lawyers’ reasons for failing to
explain these exceptions honestly, and identifies the legal and moral
considerations requiring candor to the client on this topic. Part III
describes the three alternatives commentators have proposed for
explaining confidentiality—that lawyers should agree to keep information
confidential, give a general explanation, or give a detailed disclosure. In
Part IV, the Article proposes a new way to discuss confidentiality. It
takes a middle ground between the general and detailed approaches in
order to encourage an honest and trusting dialogue between lawyer and
client.

Responsibility]; Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303, 1358–70 (1995) [hereinafter Zacharias, Reconciling
Professionalism and Client Interests]; Fred C. Zacharias, The Future Structure and
Regulation of Law Practice: Confronting Lies, Fictions, and False Paradigms in Legal
Ethics Regulation, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 829, 848–49 (2002) [hereinafter Zacharias, The
Future Structure and Regulation of Law Practice].
12. Clark D. Cunningham, How To Explain Confidentiality?, 9 CLINICAL L. REV.
579, 615–16 (2003).
13. See id. Professor Levin arrived at a similar conclusion after conducting her
own empirical research:
It is easy to say that clients should be told about this confidentiality
exception, but much more difficult to decide who should learn of the rule and
to devise a palatable and meaningful way to tell clients. In theory, all clients
should be told explicitly about the disclosure rule because all are entitled to
know the rules that govern their communications with their lawyers. As a
practical matter, such a requirement could confuse many clients and seriously
interfere with the development of client trust, thereby affecting lawyers’ ability
to represent their clients.
Leslie C. Levin, Testing the Radical Experiment: A Study of Lawyer Response to Clients
Who Intend To Harm Others, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 81, 145–46 (1994) (footnote omitted).
14. For purposes of this Article, we are focusing on confidentiality exceptions that
arise only under the duty of confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege. We
recognize that other laws also create exceptions, see, e.g., infra note 25, and we believe
that our framework for dialogue would apply to those exceptions as well.

160

[VOL. 48: 157, 2011]

Confidentiality Explained
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

II. UNDERSTANDING CONFIDENTIALITY
The most common justification for keeping client communications
confidential, whether under the ethical duty of confidentiality or the
attorney-client privilege, is that clients will not fully share all relevant
information with lawyers if they do not believe lawyers will keep that
information confidential, and that lawyers need full information to
represent clients effectively.15 Other commentators have offered a
nonconsequentionalist rationale grounded solely in respecting client
autonomy.16 Although clients can of course consent to disclosure,17
15. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (noting the purpose
of the attorney-client privilege “is to encourage full and frank communication between
attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance
of law and administration of justice”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 8
(2010) (“[A] lawyer can be sure that preserving client confidences ordinarily serves the
public interest because people are more likely to seek legal advice, and thereby heed
their legal obligations, when they know their communications will be private.”); id. R.
1.6 cmt. 2 (stating that the lawyer’s obligation to maintain confidentiality “contributes to
the trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship” because the client is
“encouraged to seek legal assistance and to communicate fully and frankly with the
lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter”); 8 JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2291, at 545 (John T. McNaughton
ed., 1961) (arguing the policy of the attorney-client privilege is “to promote freedom of
consultation of legal advisers by clients [by removing] the apprehension of compelled
disclosure by the legal advisers”); see also GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW
AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 347 (4th ed. 2005) (“The most cited justification for the
principle of client confidentiality is encouragement of clients to communicate fully with
the lawyer and to seek early legal assistance even about embarrassing matters.”); 1
HAZARD ET AL., supra note 5, § 9.2, at 9-10 (“Although empirical evidence of the extent
to which clients rely on the principle of confidentiality is sparse at best, it is intuitively
obvious that it must play some role in shaping lawyer-client relationships. Plainly,
lawyers operating under a binding requirement of confidentiality will have at least some
greater ability to gain the trust of some clients, and hence to serve them more
effectively.”); EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON
EVIDENCE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 3.2.3, at 160–61 (2d ed. 2010); DAVID LUBAN,
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 189–92 (1988); Levin, supra note 13, at 97;
Zacharias, supra note 8, at 352–53.
16. See HAZARD ET AL., supra note 15, at 347 (“Another purpose served by
confidentiality is . . . [t]o encourage people to rely on others . . . [by] trust[ing] those in
whose hands they place their affairs.”); see also MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH,
UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS § 3, at 45–69 (3d ed. 2004); id. § 5, at 129–39;
Albert W. Alschuler, The Preservation of a Client’s Confidences: One Value Among
Many or a Categorical Imperative?, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 349, 349–55 (1981); Monroe
H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three
Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1473 (1966); Stephen Pepper, Why
Confidentiality?, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 331, 335–36 (1998).
17. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2010) (explaining that
clients can consent expressly or implicitly to disclosure of confidential information).
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ethical rules and evidentiary rules provide a number of exceptions to
confidentiality that permit or require disclosure without the client’s
consent.18 After describing these exceptions, we will review the
empirical studies of lawyers’ explanations, and clients’ understandings,
of confidentiality. Next, we will explain lawyers’ legal and moral
obligations to communicate the existence of these exceptions to clients.
A. Exceptions to Confidentiality
Confidentiality doctrine, including both the ethical duty of confidentiality
under the rules and the attorney-client privilege, balances the value that
“the public interest is usually best served by a strict rule requiring
lawyers to preserve the confidentiality of information relating to the
representation of their clients”19 with a series of specific exceptions.20
These exceptions fall roughly within three categories: harm prevention,
client perjury, and lawyer protection.21
18. Although both the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality and the attorney-client
evidentiary privilege “are based on the instrumental idea that clients will more likely
confide fully in lawyers if they can do so behind a veil of secrecy” and also “based on
the moral ideas of autonomy, privacy, and trust,” there are still many important
differences regarding scope between the ethical duty of confidentiality and the attorneyclient privilege. 1 HAZARD ET AL., supra note 5, § 9.7, at 9-25. The scope of the
lawyer’s duty of confidentiality is broader than the attorney-client privilege. The duty of
confidentiality extends to all “information relating to the representation of a client,”
whereas privilege applies only to confidential communications made from client to
lawyer for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance to client. Compare
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a), with 8 WIGMORE, supra note 15, § 2292, at
554. Thus, the duty of confidentiality prevents lawyers from volunteering confidential
information, while the attorney-client privilege protects against compelled disclosure of
confidential communication in formal proceedings. See 1 HAZARD ET AL., supra note 5,
§ 9.2, at 9-6, § 9.7, at 9-25. Both the duty of confidentiality and the attorney-client
privilege are subject to a number of parallel exceptions. See, e.g., Purcell v. Dist.
Attorney, 676 N.E.2d 436, 438–41 (Mass. 1997) (grappling with the harm prevention
exception to confidentiality and the crime fraud exception to privilege); FREEDMAN &
SMITH, supra note 16, §§ 6.18–.19, at 186–90 (discussing whether a client’s intention to
commit perjury is within protection of the attorney-client privilege, and whether a client
testifying after having been warned is an implied waiver of privilege); HAZARD ET AL.,
supra note 15, at 356 n.33 (describing the lawyer-protection exceptions to both
confidentiality and privilege).
19. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 6 (2010); see supra note 15.
20. See generally Roy M. Sobelson, Lawyers, Clients and Assurances of
Confidentiality: Lawyers Talking Without Speaking, Clients Hearing Without Listening,
1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 703 (1988) (discussing at least fifteen exceptions to
confidentiality worth explaining to a client); see also Paul F. Rothstein, “Anything You
Say May Be Used Against You”: A Proposed Seminar on the Lawyer’s Duty To Warn of
Confidentiality’s Limits in Today’s Post-Enron World, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1745,
1749–63 (2007) (offering a list of twenty-five exceptions that may be important for a
client to know).
21. See HAZARD ET AL., supra note 15, at 347 (noting three categories in its overview of
exceptions to confidentiality); Cunningham, supra note 12, at 581–82 (categorizing
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The harm prevention exceptions allow lawyers to disclose confidential
information in order to prevent harms to the client or to third parties.22
Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) allows disclosure “to prevent reasonably certain
death or substantial bodily harm,” either to the client, as in the case of
potential suicide for example, or to a third party.23 Rule 1.6(b)(2) and
(3) permit disclosure
to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain
to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and
in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer’s services;
[and] . . . to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or
property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the
client’s commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has
used the lawyer’s services.24

Last, rule 1.13 provides an additional ground for discretionary disclosure
where a lawyer has actual knowledge of legal violations that threaten
substantial injury to an organization, the lawyer has taken this
information to the “highest authority” in the organization, the highest
authority refused to take corrective action, and the lawyer is “reasonably
certain” that substantial injury will occur without disclosure.25

exceptions in this way because it was useful in tackling how to explain confidentiality to
clients).
22. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 6.
23. Id. R. 1.6(b).
24. Id. Under some circumstances, these disclosures are mandatory. Rule
1.6(b)(2) and (3) track the attorney-client privilege doctrine, which provides for courts to
require disclosure under these circumstances. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 63 (2000). A minority of states also require disclosure on their
versions of Model Rule 1.6(b). See, e.g., ARIZ. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT ER. 1.6(b)
(2010); CONN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2010); FLA. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 4-1.6(b) (2010); ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c) (2010); N.D.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2010); NEV. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c)
(2010); N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT RPC 1.6(b) (2010); TENN. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.6(c) (2010); TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.05(e)
(2009); VA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c) (2010); WASH. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2010); WIS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT FOR ATTORNEYS SCR
20:1.6(b) (2005). For purposes of our categories, we classify mandatory disclosure
under the category of lawyer protection because lawyers would be disclosing in order to
avoid punishment.
25. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2010). Although we are limiting
our analysis in this Article to the ethics rules and attorney-client privilege, other laws
also create exceptions to confidentiality. With regard to corporate clients, such
exceptions arise both under the Sarbanes Oxley regulations governing securities lawyers,
see Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 & 29 U.S.C.), and under the doctrine of Garner v. Wolfinbarger,
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We classify these exceptions as harm prevention because their purpose
is to provide the lawyer with discretion to disclose in order to prevent
harm. When disclosure to prevent harm is mandatory, such as in the
minority of jurisdictions that require disclosure on these grounds,26 or
when the court requires disclosure under an exception to attorney-client
privilege, we instead place the exception in the lawyer protection
category where a primary purpose of disclosure is to avoid sanction.
Fred Zacharias described the harm protection exceptions as “fully
paternalistic.”27 Not only is the decision to disclose wholly the lawyer’s
own, but the lawyer theoretically need not even consult with the client
regarding the decision.28 As a discretionary matter, the Model Rules do
recommend consultation. They urge that before making a disclosure the
lawyer should attempt to persuade the client to take action to avoid the
need for lawyer disclosure.29
The second category of exceptions is the lawyer’s mandatory duty to
disclose confidential information in order to prevent fraud on the court,
particularly client perjury. Rule 3.3(a)(3) requires a lawyer to take
“reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the
tribunal” to prevent perjury from taking place or to remedy it if it has
already occurred.30 The commentary to rule 3.3 recommends that
lawyers consult with clients, so that disclosure is a last resort.31 Similarly,
430 F.2d 1093, 1103–04 (5th Cir. 1970), which permits shareholders to obtain privileged
information for good cause.
26. Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin have rules where disclosure is
mandatory in order to prevent harm. See STEPHEN GILLERS ET AL., REGULATION OF
LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 80–87 (2010).
27. Zacharias, Limits on Client Autonomy in Legal Ethics Regulation, supra note
11, at 211–12 (internal quotation marks omitted). The rules are described as
“paternalistic” because of the rulemakers’ preference for a societal interest over the
client’s interest in maintaining confidentiality. Id. at 211.
28. This is true even under Model Rule 1.13, which requires the lawyer to bring
the subject of the disclosure to the attention of the highest authority of the organization.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13. If the highest authority does not act to
protect the organization from injury, the lawyer need not consult again regarding
whether to disclose under rule 1.13(c). See supra text accompanying note 25.
29. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 14 (2010) (“Where practicable,
the lawyer should first seek to persuade the client to take suitable action to obviate the
need for disclosure.”).
30. See id. R. 3.3; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120
(2000); see also Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 171 (1986). Under the Model Rules
and the Restatement, the client perjury exception is mandatory if necessary, unlike both
the harm prevention exceptions and the lawyer-protection exceptions, which merely
grant the lawyer permission to disclose client information if reasonably necessary.
31. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 10 (2010) (recommending
that once the lawyer becomes aware of false testimony, the lawyer’s first course of
options should be to remonstrate with the client, advise the client of the lawyer’s duty of
candor to the court, and see if the client will cooperate with correcting the false testimony).
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rule 3.3(b) requires that “[a] lawyer who represents a client in an
adjudicative proceeding and who knows that a person intends to engage,
is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to
the proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if
necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.”32 The phrase “if necessary”
implies that the lawyer encourage the client to avoid or disclose fraud on
the court in order to make the disclosure unnecessary, but neither the
rule nor the commentary expressly recommends or requires consultation.
Although the category seeks to prevent harm, the harm is a specialized
one—the harm of fraud on the court to the legal system.33 By making
such disclosure mandatory, the rules make it a higher priority than
prevention of harm to clients or third parties.34 We distinguish the fraudon-the-court category from the mandatory disclosures that fall under
lawyer protection because the primary purpose of the perjury exception
is to protect the legal system and not the lawyer.
The third category of confidentiality exceptions exists for lawyer
protection and includes both mandatory and discretionary provisions.
Under various circumstances, the lawyer either may or must disclose to
protect the lawyer’s self-interest.35 Rule 1.6(b)(4) and (5) permit
lawyers to reveal confidential client information
to secure legal advice about the lawyer’s compliance with these Rules; [or] to
establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between
the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil
claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved,

32. See id. R. 3.3(b).
33. See id. R. 3.3 cmt. 2.
34. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 16, § 5.11, at 151–58 (criticizing the
higher level of importance given to mandatory exceptions over other more compelling
reasons to reveal confidences that have been made discretionary exceptions); Limor ZerGutman, Revising the Ethical Rules of Attorney-Client Confidentiality: Towards a New
Discretionary Rule, 45 LOY. L. REV. 669, 676 (1999) (describing a “‘hierarchy of protection’”
of interests that are benefited by confidentiality exceptions).
35. See DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, REAL ETHICS FOR REAL LAWYERS 182 (2005)
(describing how these provisions were adopted by lawyers as a self-serving exception to
protect lawyer economic interests); Zacharias, supra note 8, at 370 (explaining that one
of the motivations for adopting these provisions was “[w]hen the strict general
prohibitions against disclosure affected the personal and economic convenience of
lawyers most directly”). Lawyer-protection exceptions are also rationalized under the
principles of agency, so that the beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship is not allowed to
exploit the relationship to the detriment of the fiduciary. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 11 (2010); see Zacharias, supra note 8, at 361–62 & nn.46–47
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 cmt. f (1958)).
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or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation
of the client.36

The attorney-client privilege has a similar discretionary exception
allowing a lawyer to waive the privilege for purposes of “[l]awyer [s]elf[p]rotection.”37
The lawyer-protection exceptions also include mandatory provisions.
A court can order disclosure of information that is confidential under the
Model Rules but not under the attorney-client privilege. This can
include confidential information beyond the scope of the attorney-client
privilege,38 or within the crime-fraud exception that applies when a
client
consults a lawyer for the purpose, later accomplished, of obtaining assistance to
engage in a crime or fraud or aiding a third person to do so, or . . . regardless of
the client’s purpose at the time of consultation, uses the lawyer’s advice or other
services to engage in or assist a crime or fraud.39

The Model Rules have a related provision that uses permissive language
to permit a lawyer to breach confidentiality “to comply with other law or
a court order”40 to make clear that obeying a disclosure order does not
violate the rules.

36. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(4)–(5) (2010). Disclosures are
permitted in the context of fee collection disputes. See id. R. 1.6(b)(5); id. R. 1.6 cmt.
11; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 65 (2000) (stating a
lawyer may use or disclose confidential client information in a compensation dispute);
see also Doe v. United States (In re Shargel), 742 F.2d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 1984) (upholding
a grand jury’s inquiry into fees paid to lawyer); In re Slaughter, 694 F.2d 1258, 1259
(11th Cir. 1982) (holding no privilege for fee information). Disclosures are also
permitted to establish defenses to malpractice claims or criminal charges. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(5); id. R. 1.6 cmt. 11; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 64 (2000) (stating a lawyer may use or disclose
confidential client information in a lawyer’s self-defense); see also Meyerhofer v.
Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190, 1194–95 (2d Cir. 1974) (“[A] lawyer
may reveal confidences or secrets necessary to defend himself against ‘an accusation of
wrongful conduct.’”); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co.,
110 F.R.D. 557, 560, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that a lawyer may disclose confidences in
suit against the attorney brought by third party); In re Friend, 411 F. Supp. 776, 777
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding the lawyer who was the target of a grand jury may disclose).
37. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 83 (2000); see
also HAZARD ET AL., supra note 15, at 356 n.33.
38. See supra note 18.
39. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 82 (2000).
40. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(6) (2010).
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B. Empirical Evidence on Lawyer-Client Communications
Regarding Confidentiality
Existing empirical studies have shown both that clients are generally
unaware of the specific exceptions to confidentiality rules and that many
lawyers do not accurately explain confidentiality to clients.41 They
neither prove nor disprove lawyers’ intuitions that clients require a
pledge of absolute confidentiality, even if false, in order to share
information with lawyers.42
1. Lawyer Communications
Zacharias noted that “the most striking revelation” of his 1989
published survey of lawyers and clients was that “lawyers overwhelmingly
do not tell clients of confidentiality rules.”43 He discovered that 22.6%
of the surveyed lawyers said that they never tell clients about
confidentiality.44 Of the lawyers who told their clients about confidentiality,

41. See Levin, supra note 13, at 97 & n.63 (stating that existing empirical research
demonstrates that “as a practical matter, lawyers do not tell clients about the exceptions to
confidentiality rules”).
42. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 15, § 5.2.2, at 311–35 (recognizing existing
empirical research as more than the absence of proof that clients require privilege in
order to be forthcoming with their lawyers because data suggests only “a small minority
of clients . . . would be altogether deterred from consulting and that perhaps a significant
minority would be dissuaded from being completely candid during the consultation,” but
still cautioning the limited amount of existing research); Zacharias, supra note 8, at 378
(finding empirical studies “support the notion that confidentiality rules have some impact
on the way clients use attorneys. But they also cast doubt on whether the effect is as
substantial as proponents of confidentiality presume”). But see FREEDMAN & SMITH,
supra note 16, § 5.06, at 139–40 (criticizing the flawed methodology and misplaced
reliance on existing empirical research as “authority that confidentiality is not important
to candid disclosure by clients to lawyers”).
43. Zacharias, supra note 8, at 382. Zacharias’s study targeted both lawyers and
laypeople, located in Tompkins County, New York. His study surveyed 63 lawyers and
105 laypeople, of which 73 were “clients” who previously consulted a lawyer. Id. at
379.
44. Id. at 382 (indicating that 22.6% of the surveyed lawyers said they almost
never informed clients about confidentiality, and 59.7% said they inform clients less than
50% of the time). In addition, the study demonstrated that when the lawyers do explain
confidentiality, 42.6% of those lawyers do it in the first meeting with a client, although
55.7% “wait until the client asks, seems to hesitate to confide, or until a specific problem
of confidentiality arises.” Id.; see Levin, supra note 13, at 124 (stating in her survey
study of New Jersey lawyers that when the lawyers did explain state mandatory
disclosure rules, about 25% did so at the first client meeting, while 42% did so when the
issue came up).
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most—72.1%—told their clients “only generally that all communications
are confidential,”45 and only 27.8% of lawyers told their clients about the
exceptions to confidentiality.46 Interestingly, the self-reported practice
of lawyers in Zacharias’s study contrasted sharply with the surveyed
client responses. Although all surveyed lawyers reported they discussed
confidentiality with their clients,47 72.9% of clients said their lawyers
never told them anything about confidentiality.48 Only one out of the
seventy-three surveyed clients—a mere 1.4%—recalled a lawyer
mentioning specific confidentiality exceptions.49 Most of these clients
still claimed to know of confidentiality generally but received their
information from friends, books, television, or other sources.50
A later study conducted by Leslie C. Levin in 1993 surveyed a large
pool of lawyers in the state of New Jersey regarding their experiences
with the state’s mandatory duty to disclose to prevent harm.51 Levin’s
study showed that lawyers discussed confidentiality with their clients
“more than previously reported” but still did not talk about
confidentiality exceptions.52 She discovered that 95% of the surveyed
lawyers told clients about confidentiality but that 65% had not informed
any of their clients about their mandatory obligation to disclose
confidential information in order to prevent harm.53 Furthermore, most
of the surveyed lawyers believed that their clients did not correctly
understand the limited scope of confidentiality.54 Levin concluded that
her “study confirmed that lawyers do not tell most of their clients about
the disclosure rules, even though they do not believe their clients
understand the rules.”55
45. Zacharias, supra note 8, at 386.
46. Id.
47. As stated above, 72.1% assured absolute confidentiality, although 27.8% told
their clients about exceptions. Id.
48. Id. at 382–83.
49. Id. at 386.
50. See id. at 383 (stating 32.1% claimed to have “learned of confidentiality from
friends, books, or television,” although “41.1% could not identify the source of their
knowledge”); see also Zacharias, Limited Performance Agreements, supra note 11, at 941
n.137 (stating that society gains awareness of lawyer responsibilities through
communities’ shared experiences, literature, and media).
51. See Levin, supra note 13, at 107–11. Levin’s study surveyed 776 New Jersey
lawyers in total. Id. at 110 n.118.
52. Id. at 120.
53. Id. at 120–21 (“Another 23% of the respondents stated they had informed less
than 10% of their clients of this disclosure obligation.”).
54. Id. at 122 n.183 (reporting that approximately 20% of surveyed lawyers
believed that none of their clients correctly understood that there were circumstances
where lawyers could disclose confidential information without their consent, although
40% believed that less than 10% of their clients correctly understood confidentiality
exceptions).
55. See id. at 144.
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Both Zacharias and Levin found that lawyers suggest that
confidentiality is absolute because they believe that representation
necessary to encourage clients to confide in them.56 Levin aptly referred
to this view as the perpetuation of “the myth of strict confidentiality.”57
Many lawyers fear that discussing confidentiality exceptions with clients
would interfere with client trust and that as a result clients would be less
likely to reveal damaging information if they did not think their lawyers
would keep it confidential.58 Without the free flow of information from
the client, it is believed that lawyers will not have the opportunity to
prevent harm to another person or fraud on the court.59 And yet,
according to Zacharias’s study, only 3.2% of surveyed lawyers actually
believed that absolute confidentiality was necessary for them to
discourage potential client wrongdoing,60 suggesting that this rationale
for ensuring confidentiality is not actually relevant on a regular basis.61
56. See id. at 141; see also Zacharias, The Future Structure and Regulation of Law
Practice, supra note 11, at 849 (arguing that many code provisions, such as confidentiality
rules, have underlying assumptions about the trustworthy image of lawyers designed to
improve client trust).
57. Levin, supra note 13, at 141.
58. See id. at 122–23 (“Many New Jersey lawyers seem to discuss confidentiality
in order to develop client trust and to encourage the free flow of client information. At
the same time, most lawyers do not discuss the subject of mandatory disclosure unless
they must do so, apparently because they feel that discussions about confidentiality exceptions
interfere with client trust. These lawyers seem to believe they will obtain less than full
disclosure from their clients if they promise anything less than complete confidentiality.”
(footnotes omitted)); Zacharias, supra note 8, at 389 (stating that 66.1% of surveyed
lawyers thought a primary reason for absolute confidentiality was “the need ‘to encourage
clients to discuss their cases fully’”); see also STEPHEN ELLMANN ET AL., LAWYERS AND
CLIENTS: CRITICAL ISSUES IN INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 246 (2009); cf. Elisia
Klinka, Note, It’s Been a Privilege: Advising Patients of the Tarasoff Duty and Its Legal
Consequences for the Federal Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
863, 894 (2009) (describing the “deterrence hypothesis,” in which it was believed that
patients would be deterred from openly confiding in psychotherapists or seeking mental
health treatment altogether when patients became aware of state laws requiring psychotherapists
to disclose a patient’s intent to harm others, commonly known as a Tarasoff duty).
59. See Zacharias, supra note 8, at 389; see also Levin, supra note 13, at 97
(“Confidentiality proponents argue that if the client is deterred from communicating with
counsel about those future plans by fear of attorney disclosure, then the attorney will not
have the opportunity to prevent the wrongful act.”).
60. See Zacharias, supra note 8, at 389. Zacharias acknowledged that the
questionnaire’s wording may have affected the statistical outcome because the surveyed
lawyers may have thought that encouraging client communication is a prerequisite for
preventing client misconduct. Id. Nonetheless, “even excluding confidentiality’s systemic
justifications from the results, we are left with a third of the responses.” Id. And less
than one-tenth of those lawyers selected the preventing misconduct rationale. Id.
61. See id.
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The failure of lawyers to honestly explain the contours of
confidentiality accords generally with empirical research regarding
lawyers’ communication with clients. These studies show that lawyers
prefer to control client decisionmaking and as a result do not always
communicate full information to clients.62 With the exception of
corporate representation where clients do appear to be in control and
fully informed,63 the studies also indicate that many lawyers have a deep
mistrust of the capacity of clients to make their own decisions because
lawyers view clients as categorically too emotional, unintelligent,
selfish, or immoral to comprehend the best outcome of the
representation.64 When lawyers do present issues to clients, they often
do so in a way that masks their mistrust for clients and frames their
advice as if it is in the best interest of the client.65
62. See DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO’S IN CHARGE? 114
(1974) (explaining a study focusing on personal injury cases in New York, in which over
one-third of surveyed lawyers did not recognize any broad obligation to inform clients
about their cases or allow them to take part in decisionmaking, and more than 80% of the
surveyed lawyers “reject[ed] any obligation to disclose and discuss arguably material
and specific legal alternatives involved in the claim”).
63. See, e.g., EVE SPANGLER, LAWYERS FOR HIRE: SALARIED PROFESSIONALS AT
WORK 64 (1986); Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy:
Social Values and Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503,
504–05 (1985).
64. See, e.g., Marvin W. Mindes & Alan C. Acock, Trickster, Hero, Helper: A
Report on the Lawyer Image, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 177, 215–18 (demonstrating
the findings of an empirical study that lawyers tend to assume clients have selfish
motives); Tamara Relis, “It’s Not About the Money!”: A Theory on Misconceptions of
Plaintiffs’ Litigation Aims, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 701, 713, 721–23 (2007) (showing the
results of an empirical study focusing on medical malpractice to be that lawyers felt the
reason plaintiffs sued was “solely or predominantly” for money, whereas most plaintiffs
were actually motivated by seeking admission of responsibility, prevention of harm to
others, answers to what happened, and retribution for misconduct, without even mentioning
money); Ann Southworth, Lawyer-Client Decisionmaking in Civil Rights and Poverty
Practice: An Empirical Study of Lawyers’ Norms, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1101, 1112
(1996) (reflecting on an empirical study focusing on civil rights and poverty issues
where lawyers tend to control decisionmaking about cases because their clients were
“unsophisticated,” “‘had no idea what to do,’” or simply expected the lawyers to take
charge); see also Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence Game:
Organizational Cooptation of a Profession, LAW & SOC’Y REV., June 1967, at 15, 22–29
(concluding from an empirical study looking at decisionmaking during plea bargaining
that defense lawyers generally assume from their experiences that most clients are
factually guilty and that they should exercise “client control” by trying to persuade
clients to trust their recommendations to accept adequate plea bargains); Rodney J.
Uphoff & Peter B. Wood, The Allocation of Decisionmaking Between Defense Counsel
and Criminal Defendant: An Empirical Study of Attorney-Client Decisionmaking, 47 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1, 55 (1998) (demonstrating the findings of an empirical study focusing on
public defenders that most of the lawyers felt that they should dominate decisionmaking
about strategy and tactics, even in the face of client opposition, because they assumed
that criminal clients generally make bad decisions and have low intelligence).
65. See Lynn Mather, What Do Clients Want? What Do Lawyers Do?, 52 EMORY
L.J. 1065, 1076 (2003) (describing how divorce lawyers remind their clients that their
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2. Client Attitudes and Understandings
Very few studies have investigated what clients actually know about
confidentiality exceptions and the effect this knowledge has on
representation. Accordingly, little or no evidence exists to substantiate
the presumption that clients would not confide in lawyers without the
guarantee of absolute confidentiality.66
Prior to Zacharias’s study, The Yale Law Journal conducted a survey
of judges, accountants, marriage counselors, psychiatrists, psychologists,
and social workers, as well as 125 lawyers and 108 laypeople “on their
attitudes and practices regarding the privileged communications rule” for
different professions.67 The survey found that most laypeople were
unaware of the attorney-client privilege.68 More than half of laypeople
either thought that lawyers should be allowed to reveal clients’
confidences when asked to in court—37%—or did not take a position
necessarily opposing disclosure—17.6%.69 The survey results “indicated
widespread faulty information concerning the attorney-client privilege.”70
Interestingly, surveyed lawyers believed that privilege encouraged client
advice is in the client’s best interest or “‘what the law requires’” because it helps
persuade clients to accept settlements or positions that lawyers feel are adequate,
although these lawyers admit that their advice is often influenced by a number of other
factors, such as maintaining a reasonable reputation with other lawyers and courts); see
also AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM L.F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS:
POWER AND MEANING IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 57, 146 (1995) (describing how divorce
lawyers “construct meanings in the service of [their own] power” and may even exaggerate
risk of loss to the client).
66. Shelly Stucky Watson, Keeping Secrets that Harm Others: Medical Standards
Illuminate Lawyer’s Dilemma, 71 NEB. L. REV. 1123, 1130–31 (1992) (noting such a
conclusion is questionable and “in the abstract it is difficult to determine the extent of
any effect”); see supra note 42; cf. Klinka, supra note 58, at 894–96 (noting a lack of
evidence to substantiate the anticipated adverse effects upon the psychotherapist-patient
relationship since the Tarasoff decision and the practice of psychotherapists advising
their patients about the limits of confidentiality).
67. Comment, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals:
Its Implications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1226–
27 & 1227 n.6 (1962) [hereinafter Functional Overlap].
68. Id. at 1232. Approximately 55 of 108 surveyed laypeople thought that lawyers
did not have a legal obligation to disclose confidential information if asked to do so in
court. Id. app. at 1262, question 5.
69. Id. at 1236 n.60 (finding that although forty-nine surveyed laypeople endorsed
having an attorney-client privilege, forty opposed it and nineteen expressed no opinion).
Still, “for every four laymen who opposed the attorney-client privilege, there were five
who favored it, which suggests substantial community support.” Id. at 1236.
70. Id. at 1236 (“The mythical average American is, as likely as not, either
misinformed or uninformed about the attorney-client privilege.”).
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candor “significantly more than laymen” believed it did.71 Although half
of surveyed laypeople said that the absence of any privilege for
communications with lawyers would make them less willing to confide
in lawyers, the findings asked about the existence of any confidentiality
protection whatsoever and did not explore the respondent’s views on
confidentiality protections that included limited exceptions.72 At the
same time, a substantial number—approximately 34%—said they would
not be less likely to share confidences with lawyers if there were no
guarantee of privilege, and another 15% did not know.73 The study
concluded that “most were willing to disclose to their attorney even on
the erroneous assumption that the judge has the power to simply
override the privilege ad hoc—strongly suggesting that they would still
use an attorney’s services if the privilege were classified as qualified or
conditional rather than absolute.”74
Twenty-seven years later, Zacharias enriched the limited empirical
findings of the Yale study with his research. Zacharias’s study also
revealed “widespread misunderstanding among clients as to the nature of
confidentiality and its scope.”75 Half of the surveyed laypeople in his
study incorrectly thought that confidentiality was absolute.76 Combining
this statistic with the reported practice of his surveyed lawyers,77
Zacharias concluded that “if lawyers inform their clients about
confidentiality at all, they overstate its scope,” and perhaps worse: many

71. Id. at 1232 & n.38 (finding that 90 of 125 surveyed lawyers responded
affirmatively that if clients believe lawyers have a legal obligation not to disclose the
client’s confidential communications then the effect will be to encourage client candor
but 55 of 108 surveyed laypeople said they would be less likely to be candid with a
lawyer if there was no privilege).
72. See id. app. at 1262, question 6 (finding that 55 of 108 surveyed laypeople
answered that they would be “less likely to make free and complete disclosure” to their
lawyers if they were aware that their lawyer had a legal obligation to disclose
confidential information if asked to do so in court); see also IMWINKELRIED, supra note
15, § 5.2.2, at 325 (tempering the results of this part of the survey because the question
“inquired only whether the elimination of a privilege would have an effect on their
willingness to make full disclosure to their lawyers; it did not ask them to specify the
extent of the effect or even to indicate whether the effect would be substantial or
minimal”).
73. Functional Overlap, supra note 67, app. at 1262 (finding that 37 of 108
surveyed laypeople would not be less likely to make free and complete disclosures to
their lawyer, and 16 did not know).
74. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 15, § 5.2.2, at 325–26.
75. Zacharias, supra note 8, at 381; see Watson, supra note 66, at 1130 (“It is
doubtful that clients fully understand the confidentiality rules as they now stand—if
indeed, the rules are explained to them at all.”).
76. See Zacharias, note 8, at 381, 383 (providing statistical data that 42.4% of
laypeople surveyed thought that confidentiality was absolute, although 25% thought that
the confidentiality exceptions were even more liberal than they actually are).
77. See supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text.
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of the surveyed lawyers were even aware that their clients misunderstood
the scope of confidentiality.78
Zacharias additionally found that roughly half of the surveyed
laypeople—52.5%—said that they would be less forthcoming with
information if they were not guaranteed confidentiality by their
lawyers.79 He tempered this statistic by cautioning that it is impossible
to know whether this finding reflects how the surveyed people would act
in a real-life setting.80 Indeed, the half who said they would be less
forthcoming “were operating on the incorrect assumption that current
rules require absolute confidentiality.”81 Zacharias also wisely pointed
out the “extent to which confidentiality rules induce full disclosure
depends in part on whether clients believe lawyers follow [those] rules,”
and only about 20% of the clients that thought confidentiality was
absolute in principle believed that their lawyers would actually follow
this in practice.82
Although 52.5% of surveyed laypeople said they would withhold
information if they were not guaranteed confidentiality, those respondents
were told that the lawyer would keep information secret unless it were
an unusual circumstance; Zacharias also discovered that “when the same
respondents were asked whether they would still withhold information if
the lawyer ‘promised confidentiality except for specific types of
information which he/she described in advance,’” a small number—only
15.1%—reported that “they would withhold” information from their
lawyer.83 This statistic is significant for several reasons. First, as
Zacharias noted, the figure “is not significantly different from the 11.3%
of the surveyed clients who admitted to withholding information from

78. Zacharias, supra note 8, at 386–87 (finding that close to half of the surveyed
lawyers who overstated confidentiality in general terms thought that less than half of
their clients actually had an accurate understanding of confidentiality, although almost
three-quarters of those lawyers thought that more than three-quarters of their clients
believed confidentiality was absolute).
79. Id. at 380 n.141, 386.
80. Id. at 380 n.141.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 383 (finding that 19.7% of surveyed clients believed attorneys
“[always] keep information confidential” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
Functional Overlap, supra note 67, app. at 1262, question 8 (finding that 34 out of 108
surveyed laypeople thought that a lawyer would refuse to disclose confidential information
even if ordered to do so by a judge, although another 34 believed a lawyer would not
refuse).
83. Zacharias, supra note 8, at 386.
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their attorneys under current confidentiality rules.”84 Second, the
percentage of clients asserting they would share full information with the
lawyer if the lawyer explained the specific confidentiality exceptions in
advance—84.9%—is relatively close to the percentage of clients
asserting they would share full information with lawyers who promise
absolute confidentiality—72.1%.85 Accordingly, the survey found an
explanation of confidentiality that acknowledged specific exceptions to
be roughly as effective as the pledge of absolute confidentiality for
purposes both of effective representation and gaining information
necessary to dissuade client misconduct, such as fraud on the court.86
Based on these findings, Zacharias concluded that it is “the general sense
of trust in attorneys as professionals—rather than particularly strict
confidentiality rules—[that] fosters client candor.”87
C. Doctrinal, Moral, and Strategic Obligations To Disclose
Confidentiality Exceptions
As discussed in the preceding sections, the existing empirical evidence
casts doubt on the assumption that clients require a pledge of absolute
confidentiality. We now turn to whether lawyers have an obligation to
explain to clients that exceptions to confidentiality exist. Neither the
Model Rules nor Restatement expressly requires an explanation of the
exceptions, but the duty to provide competent representation and honest
communication mandates that lawyers both refrain from misleading
clients and explain the exceptions to the extent relevant to the
representation. The lawyer’s moral responsibility to the client is similar.
Respect for client dignity requires that the lawyer tell the truth and
provide information necessary for the client to make informed decisions.
84. Id.
85. See supra text accompanying note 45.
86. Zacharias, supra note 8, at 386 (“It shows that clients never told of confidentiality
[exceptions] may be as ready to provide information as clients who were informed.”);
Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality II, supra note 11, at 641 (“Requiring lawyers to
educate clients about limited attorney-client secrecy would probably encourage at least
as much disclosure as maintaining a poorly understood, but exception-free, confidentiality
rule.”).
87. See Zacharias, supra note 8, at 386; see also Levin, supra note 13, at 139
(“Surprisingly, the lawyers who threatened to disclose their clients’ plans but did not
actually disclose reported that they did not necessarily experience a deterioration of their
relationships with their clients,” and even “[w]hen bodily injury was at stake, the lawyers
who actually disclosed client information damaged their relationships with their clients
less than might be imagined.”). Indeed, William Simon notes that corporate managers
share confidences with lawyers even when legal doctrines provide significant exceptions
and the corporation itself may decide to disclose. William H. Simon, After Confidentiality:
Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities of the Business Lawyer, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1453, 1468 (2006).
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1. Legal Obligation To Explain Confidentiality Rules
The Model Rules do not mandate lawyers to explain their confidentiality
obligation to clients as part of the creation of the lawyer-client
relationship.88 Rule 1.6, which includes both harm prevention and
lawyer-protection exceptions, only suggests that the lawyer discuss the
relevant exception with the client in order to avoid a disclosure that the
lawyer has already decided to make if the client fails to take other
corrective action.89 Only when the disclosure is required, such as by
court order, does rule 1.6 mandate a conversation with a client.90 Rule
3.3, regarding fraud on the court, does require a conversation but again
only when the lawyer has decided to disclose if the client fails to take
corrective action.91 The Restatement takes a similar approach.92
The Model Rules do require a lawyer to tell the truth when discussing
confidentiality. Rule 1.4 on client communications emphasizes the
importance of explaining relevant information to clients and only
permits a lawyer to “delay[] transmission of information” in rare
circumstances.93 It assumes that information the lawyer provides will be
honest and accurate. Other rules forbid a lawyer from lying as a general
matter. Rule 8.4, defining “misconduct,” prohibits “conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”94 Rule 4.1 requires
“[t]ruthfulness in [s]tatements to [o]thers.”95
Beyond avoiding dishonesty, the rules about informed decisionmaking
also appear to require lawyers to explain confidentiality. Rule 1.4
requires lawyers to “explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary

88. See supra Part II.A. (discussing three areas of confidentiality exceptions in
detail).
89. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 14 (2010).
90. See id. R. 1.6 cmt. 12 (“When disclosure of information relating to the
representation appears to be required by other law, the lawyer must discuss the matter
with the client to the extent required by Rule 1.4. If, however, the other law supersedes
this Rule and requires disclosure, paragraph (b)(6) permits the lawyer to make such
disclosures as are necessary to comply with the law.”).
91. Id. R. 3.3 cmt. 10.
92. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 66(2) (2000)
(bodily harm prevention exception); see also id. § 67(3) (financial harm prevention
exception); Rothstein, supra note 20, at 1765 n.81 (arguing that if this kind of warning
before disclosure is recommended as to the harm prevention exception, then it is also
applicable to the lawyer protection exception and the client perjury exception).
93. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 cmt. 7 (2010).
94. Id. R. 8.4(c).
95. Id. R. 4.1.
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to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation.”96 Confidentiality of the client’s communications would
be important and quite relevant to the client, especially to the extent that
decisions on disclosure made at an early stage of the representation
could have a significant adverse impact if they later implicate the
lawyer’s discretionary or mandatory disclosure obligations. Another
provision of rule 1.4 directly addresses one such situation that could
develop—when a lawyer must “consult with the client about any
relevant limitation on the lawyer’s conduct when the lawyer knows that
the client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional
Conduct or other law.”97
Roy M. Sobelson and Lee A. Pizzimenti have separately explained
that a conversation regarding confidentiality is fundamental to the
client’s decision whether to retain a lawyer and the lawyer’s ability to
represent a client competently. Pizzimenti notes that a discussion of the
limits of confidentiality is essential because any client would consider
those limits material to determining which confidences to share with a
lawyer.98 She writes that “[a]ttorneys may deprive those clients of
information critical to intelligent decisionmaking if they fail to apprise
clients of those exceptions, thereby limiting client’s ability to choose
rationally whether to confide in counsel.”99 Pizzimenti analogizes this to
96. Id. R. 1.4(b); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 20(3) (2000).
97. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(5) (2010).
98. Lee A. Pizzimenti, The Lawyer’s Duty To Warn Clients About Limits on
Confidentiality, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 441, 450 (1990); see Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and
Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV.
41, 116 (1979) (stating courts “should require the lawyer to inform his client of the limits
on representation” based on what a reasonable client would want to know about the
representation); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(e) (2010) (defining
“[i]nformed consent” as a client’s agreement “to a proposed course of conduct after the
lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks
of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct”). In reality,
many lawyers may have difficulty admitting that confidentiality limits are material to a
client. See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text (discussing various empirical
studies about lawyers’ encouragement, or lack thereof, of informed decisionmaking by
clients).
99. Pizzimenti, supra note 98, at 450. By framing the issue in terms of informed
consent about agreeing to representation, Pizzimenti also advocates that a lawyer’s
failure to adequately explain confidentiality to a client should result in disciplinary
action, and possibly civil liability, for mandatory disclosures that are required by law.
Id. at 463–71. Zacharias adopted the same rationale when he advocated that both
confidentiality and privilege rules should expressly require lawyers to warn clients about
potential for disclosures at the outset of the representation. Zacharias, Harmonizing
Privilege and Confidentiality, supra note 11, at 108–09; see Davalene Cooper, The
Ethical Rules Lack Ethics: Tort Liability When a Lawyer Fails To Warn a Third Party of
a Client’s Threat To Cause Serious Physical Harm or Death, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 479,
511–13 (2000) (favoring tort liability for a lawyer’s failure to warn); Watson, supra note
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conflict situations.100 If a lawyer chooses to disclose a client’s threat of
harm or future crime, then the “lawyer resolves a conflict in favor of
third parties or the legal system,” and likewise when a lawyer chooses to
exercise one of the lawyer-protection exceptions, “she resolves the
conflict in favor of herself.”101 As a result, Pizzimenti concludes that “a
presumption should arise that attorneys must make the client aware of
potential conflicts and how both parties may resolve them,” and this
must occur before the client chooses to confide in the lawyer.102
Sobelson similarly argues that an explanation of the potential limits of
confidentiality is “necessary for the fulfillment of an attorney’s
obligation to represent his client competently.”103

66, at 1139, 1144 (advocating for the recognition of a Tarasoff-modeled duty for
lawyers); Rachel Vogelstein, Note, Confidentiality vs. Care: Re-evaluating the Duty to
Self, Client, and Others, 92 GEO. L.J. 153, 170 (2003) (arguing to add a provision to
Model Rule 1.6 that requires lawyers to advise clients about confidentiality exceptions);
see also State v. Hansen, 862 P.2d 117, 122 (Wash. 1993) (“We hold that attorneys, as
officers of the court, have a duty to warn of true threats to harm members of the judiciary
communicated to them by clients or by third parties.”); Hawkins v. King Cnty. Dep’t of
Rehabilitative Servs., 602 P.2d 361, 365 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (stating in dicta that a
lawyer’s duty to warn about a client’s intent to harm others may be mandatory if “it
appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the client has formed a firm intention to inflict
serious personal injuries on an unknowing third person” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
100. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 cmt. 5 (2010) (“The guiding
principle [for explaining matters] is that the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client
expectations for information consistent with the duty to act in the client’s best interests,
and the client’s overall requirements as to the character of representation. In certain
circumstances, such as when a lawyer asks a client to consent to a representation affected
by a conflict of interest, the client must give informed consent . . . .”); see also United
States v. Blackman, 72 F.3d 1418, 1425 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Attorneys should inform
clients proffering cash in excess of $10,000 for fees that they will normally be obliged to
disclose fee-payer identity and the nature of the fee arrangement in filing [IRS] Form
8300.”); Wash. State Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 194 (1997) (interpreting Washington State
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.4 to mean that “the lawyer must inform the client that
when the client pays the lawyer more than $10,000 in cash, but does not consent to
reporting this information to the IRS, the lawyer will comply with the requirement that
IRS Form 8300 be filed as required by law, omitting the identity of the client” (emphasis
omitted)); Nat’l Ass’n Criminal Def. Lawyers Ethics Advisory Comm., Formal Op.
No. 04-01, at 1, 5 (2004) (noting that a criminal defense lawyer had a duty to raise a
conflict of interest to the client at the earliest possible time when he discovered his
client’s threat to choke a prosecutor and then commit suicide during trial that triggered
his mandatory duty to disclose under state law).
101. Pizzimenti, supra note 98, at 476.
102. Id.
103. Sobelson, supra note 20, at 711 (relying on MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 1.1 (2010)).
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Last, rule 8.4 appears to require a lawyer to explain the exceptions to
confidentiality. Even if a lawyer does not lie regarding absolute
confidentiality, the failure to say anything about the duty of
confidentiality could itself constitute a misleading communication in
violation of rule 8.4.104 A reasonable client is likely to believe that a
lawyer has a duty of confidentiality but is not familiar with the
exceptions to that duty. The failure to explain the exceptions would
mislead a reasonable client to believe that confidentiality is absolute
either in general or in regard to the client’s representation.
2. Moral and Strategic Benefits of Explaining Confidentiality
Respecting the client’s dignity and creating a relationship of trust
require lawyers, as a matter of moral responsibility, to discuss
confidentiality exceptions with clients. Fred Zacharias eloquently wrote:
[C]lient “dignity” is respected most when clients are treated as individuals who
can understand moral limitations on attorney conduct and are informed of those
limitations. Informing clients of potential limits on zealous representation, so
that clients can make their own decisions regarding how to act within the attorneyclient relationship, enhances client autonomy. Lawyers with the deepest respect
for client autonomy should be the most forthcoming in identifying regulatory
and moral constraints on their behavior for the clients.105

As Zacharias explained, respect for the dignity of clients requires that
“clients must understand the rules that will be applied to them.”106
Providing clients with accurate information regarding confidentiality
exceptions is fundamental to creating a relationship of mutual respect
and trust.
Zacharias observed that providing clients with this
information is necessary to “support an honest attorney-client
relationship that may enrich lawyer-client dialogue throughout the
representation.”107 Clients have no reason to trust a lawyer who provides
them with inaccurate information or fails to provide them with
information they want. Only when lawyers and clients trust each other
will they be able to foster a dialogue that encourages them to share
information regarding what each values and to move beyond assuming

104. Paul R. Tremblay, “Ratting,” 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 49, 86 (1993) (stating
that when reading the anti-deceit provisions of Model Rule 8.4 with the revelation
sections of Model Rule 1.6, “only one conclusion remains: Lawyers who opt to reveal
client intended crimes must inform their clients of that intention”).
105. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, supra note 11, at
1370 (footnotes omitted).
106. Zacharias, Harmonizing Privilege and Confidentiality, supra note 11, at 108
n.183; see Levin, supra note 13, at 125 (“If a client’s communications are not protected,
clients are entitled to know it before they speak.”).
107. Zacharias, Harmonizing Privilege and Confidentiality, supra note 11, at 109.
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that each is a “cardboard” person acting only out of selfish interest108 to
recognizing that each is a whole human being with a wide range of
“perceptions . . . passions and sufferings . . . reflections . . . relationships
and commitments.”109
Robert A. Burt has described the impairment of lawyer-client
relationships created without mutual respect and trust. He explains the
“mutual wariness . . . in current practice” that consists of both the lawyer
and the client approaching the relationship with mistrust: the client
hesitates to share some of his actions or intentions with a lawyer because
he is unsure how the lawyer will react, while the lawyer avoids asking
about them to prevent any need for disclosure later.110 Burt’s analysis
explains why a false pledge of strict confidentiality is ineffective. Not
only would many clients later come to understand the lawyer’s deceit,
but Burt explains that wary clients are unlikely to trust the assurance of

108. See Spiegel, supra note 98, at 118 (“Respect for an individual’s autonomy requires
an open exchange of views, although not necessarily acquiescence in anything that
person desires.”).
109. DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 76 (2007). In a recent
article, Katherine Kruse explains how lawyers generally construe clients as one-dimensional
“cardboard clients” by uniformly characterizing them as wanting to maximize their own
legal and economic interest. By overemphasizing the clients’ legal interests, lawyers risk
minimizing or even ignoring the other cares, commitments, relationships, reputations,
and values that real clients have. By not informing and consulting with the client about
the limits of confidentiality, a lawyer is essentially objectifying the client based on an
unfair generalization. See generally Katherine R. Kruse, Beyond Cardboard Clients in
Legal Ethics, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 103, 103 (2010).
Dean Imwinkelried presents an intriguing summary of psychological literature as to
what motivates clients to candidly share information with their lawyers. IMWINKELRIED,
supra note 15, § 5.2.2, at 331. He criticizes the law about evidentiary privilege for
assuming that laypeople are motivated by: “(1) the degree to which the consultation will
contribute to the immediate resolution of the problem that prompted the layperson to
consult the professional; and (2) the magnitude of the risk that any disclosure will later
be used adversely against the layperson at trial.” Id. He further argues that the law
“assumes that the typical layperson is so concerned about the second factor that without
the assurance of confidentiality furnished by an absolute evidentiary privilege, the
layperson would be unwilling to confide.” Id. And yet, research produced in psychological
literature reveals a myriad of factors that significantly influence a layperson’s willingness to
confide. Id. § 5.2.2, at 331–32. He notes that “the research has established such marked
individual variations in tendency to disclose that any generalization about the decisionmaking of the ‘typical’ or ‘average’ layperson is suspect.” Id. § 5.2.2, at 332.
110. Robert A. Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client, 69 GEO. L.J.
1015, 1028 (1981); see also id. at 1033 (discussing the mutual mistrust between lawyers
and corporate clients); id. at 1035–40 (describing the mutual mistrust between criminal
defense lawyers and clients, in the context of plea bargaining).
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total confidentiality and rely upon it to share secrets.111 Indeed, when
lawyers mislead—or fail to discuss—the contours of confidentiality,
lawyers only undermine the possibility for a mutually respectful and
trusting relationship.112 Similarly, a lawyer who does not discuss
confidentiality honestly forgoes the potential benefit of exploring
questions that both client and lawyer may perceive as possible conflicts
in a way that could build, rather than undermine, trust.113 For example, a
lawyer who views a client as preferring absolute confidence might
discover that the client understands the importance of preventing harm to
others or fraud on the court.114 The client, in turn, is likely to view the
lawyer as a person of principle upon whom the client can rely for wise
counsel.115 In any event, an honest conversation about the confidential
exceptions would empower both the lawyer and client to make
independent judgments about how much they choose to trust each other,
and whether they would like to continue in a representative
relationship.116
111. Id. at 1031.
112. Id. at 1018–28.
113. Id. at 1019–20, 1031. The absence of a discussion between lawyer and client
“robs both attorney and client of the opportunity to learn that each can adequately trust
the other.” Id. at 1032; see Zacharias, Harmonizing Privilege and Confidentiality, supra
note 11, at 109–10 n.188 (“[H]aving such a conversation at the outset of the representation
helps structure the attorney-client relationship. Clients may be disappointed in particular
positions a lawyer may take. However, by treating the client as an autonomous, decisionmaking
equal from the beginning and explaining the limits of the lawyer’s personal willingness
to obey the client, the lawyer treats the client with dignity. In the long run, this
enhances, rather than detracts, from client trust. It also sets the stage for further frank
discussions as dilemmas come to fruition down the road.”); Zacharias, Reconciling
Professionalism and Client Interests, supra note 11, at 1364 (arguing that one of the benefits
of having a conversation at the outset of representation is that both the lawyer and the
client consider their own perceptions of appropriate conduct in response to ethical
dilemmas and raise them in a neutral and objective manner); cf. Klinka, supra note 58, at
893 (discussing the formation of a “‘therapeutic alliance’” that could result from an
honest discussion between psychotherapists and patients about the limitations of confidentiality
imposed by a psychotherapist’s Tarasoff duty).
114. See supra text accompanying notes 68, 72, 76–86 (discussing potential reasons
why clients continue to confide in lawyers, even if they are aware confidentiality is not
guaranteed).
115. Lawyers who choose not to disclose because they assume their clients would
want it that way may discover that they were wrong; meanwhile, clients, after discussion
with their lawyers, may understand why disclosure is necessary in certain situations. See
Spiegel, supra note 98, at 117–19.
116. Informed decisionmaking about whether to begin a representation is also
beneficial to the lawyer because
requiring lawyers to be active in assuring themselves that they are not being
used or played the fool is fully commensurate with the idea that lawyers’
services are limited, and that clients should be told about those limitations
early on. When it is still easy for the lawyer simply to refuse to become
involved with the client, it makes good sense to require the lawyer to be active
in taking responsibility for deciding whether to cast his lot with the particular
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One can understand, though, why some well-meaning lawyers avoid
discussing confidentiality. They may fear that such discussions could
produce “some awkward moments, and perhaps even kill[] off some
budding lawyer-client relationships.”117 Although these lawyers may
have to learn to improve their client counseling skills, if they do so they
will gain significant rewards. The conversation regarding exceptions
will itself promote trust. From the client’s perspective, “the lawyer
has . . . displayed his trustworthiness in concrete terms.”118 Indeed,
empirical evidence indicates that clients find legal representation more
satisfying when they are meaningful, active participants.119 A discussion
of client values may also help lawyers confront their mistrust of clients
and place a check on their own motivations for controlling
decisionmaking.120
By withholding an explanation about confidentiality rules from
clients, lawyers assume down the road that they will be in a morally
superior position to make a decision as to whether a client’s confidential
communication should be shared with others.121 And perhaps this is a
client. Lawyers who accept clients unwisely will not lightly be heard to argue
that they were caught unawares, for these rules impose a duty of vigilance at
the very gates of access to the profession.
W. William Hodes, The Code of Professional Responsibility, the Kutak Rules, and the
Trial Lawyer’s Code: Surprisingly, Three Peas in a Pod, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 739, 806
(1981).
117. Id. at 775; see Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests,
supra note 11, at 1365; see also Spiegel, supra note 98, at 118 (noting that in cases in
which the lawyer’s decision is at odds with the client’s decision, the doctrine of informed
consent would not require the lawyer to follow the client’s decision simply because the
client does not consent; rather after discussing the issue with the client, the lawyer can
make a decision and then justify it to the client, and if the client insists on the opposing
decision, the lawyer would be able to withdraw from representation); Eli Wald, Taking
Attorney-Client Communications (and Therefore Clients) Seriously, 42 U.S.F. L. REV.
747, 775 (2008) (dispelling reasons to forgo a discussion about confidentiality rules
because even if clients misunderstand the rules or proceed to act impulsively in a way
that will not benefit their best interests, “lawyers can address the concern by effectively
explaining the information, per Rule 1.4(b), or explaining why the information is
irrelevant given the decision facing the client”).
118. Hodes, supra note 116, at 786–87.
119. See ROSENTHAL, supra note 62, at 56–58 (concluding that clients who were
actively involved in their cases and regularly demanded information from their lawyers
got better case recoveries); Susan R. Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practice of Law,
48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 307, 310 (1980) (arguing that informed consent protects client
autonomy and benefits the attorney-client relationship).
120. Kruse, supra note 109, at 141; see supra notes 62, 65, and accompanying text.
121. See Judith L. Maute, Allocation of Decisionmaking Authority Under the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1049, 1058 (1984) (“A paternalist
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safe assumption, given the fact that the Model Rules specifically reserve
the decision to disclose to lawyers.122 Arguably, lawyers are “less
personally and emotionally invested” in a legal matter and are
considered “better situated in legal representation to bring moral
considerations to bear.”123 Shaffer and Cochran call this “godfather
lawyering” because lawyers act as if they “know better than clients what
will be in their clients’ interests.”124 The traditional reason given by
lawyers who choose not to explain confidentiality rules to clients is
because they determine it is in the best interest of the client: only if
clients candidly disclose full information will lawyers be able to
adequately represent their clients.125 This argument disregards the fact
that decisions by lawyers not to explain confidentiality rules may be
influenced by their “own wants, interests, and values,” such as appearing
completely dedicated in order to win a retainer or gathering as much
information as possible so as not to be surprised or embarrassed later
on.126
Last, some lawyers may not explain confidentiality exceptions because
they assume a situation implicating any confidentiality exception is
rare.127 But failure to discuss the exceptions creates the potential for
lawyer is morally isolated from the client, acting in ways that she thinks will benefit the
client without discourse about what the client wants or needs.”).
122. See supra notes 27–39 and accompanying text (describing the paternalistic
nature of confidentiality exceptions). In a recent article, Eli Wald argues that the Model
Rules encourage an asymmetrical exchange of certain types of information between
lawyers and clients, such as “‘meta’ facts.” Wald, supra note 117, at 756. Meta facts are
defined as “background and personal information” belonging to both the lawyer and the
client. Id. For example, meta facts about the lawyer include the lawyer’s experience,
expertise, reputation, and “how the attorney plans on exercising . . . professional
judgment and discretion in revealing confidential client information.” Id. Wald argues
that ethical rules are designed to “foster a ‘tell all’ attitude encouraging clients to
disclose all . . . facts . . . to their attorneys,” although lawyers are not encouraged to
reveal meta facts about themselves to their clients. Id. at 757, 768–69. Ultimately, the
Model Rules make it “less likely that clients will be able to occupy the role of informed
principals” in the lawyer-client relationship. Id. at 757.
123. Kruse, supra note 109, at 139; see Wald, supra note 117, at 770, 773–74.
124. See THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 9 (1994); see also Pizzimenti, supra note 98, at 484.
125. See Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659, 667–69 (1990)
(presenting a description of the traditional model of the lawyer-client relationship as
trying to justify lawyer deception as necessary in order for lawyers to fulfill their duties
to their clients, and criticism that lawyers are paternalistic, manipulative, and exploitative
of their clients under the traditional model); see also supra notes 55–59, 65 and
accompanying text.
126. Kruse, supra note 109, at 139; see Lerman, supra note 125, at 671–72 (arguing
that a fundamental conflict of interest exists between lawyers and clients because many
lawyers in private practice are primarily motivated to earn money).
127. Monroe Freedman and Abbe Smith feel that a discussion about confidentiality
exceptions is unnecessary altogether because the likelihood of disclosure “is so slight
that the harm that would be done to the lawyer-client relationship by a Miranda warning
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disaster if the lawyer has to explain exceptions later, much less disclose
a confidence. As Fred Zacharias noted, when lawyers manipulate clients
into confiding under a general veil of confidentiality, it “undercuts
another of confidentiality’s basic rationales: that confidentiality helps
clients make informed choices and thus enhances their dignity and
‘autonomy.’”128 Indeed, absent an explanation of the exceptions, “the
most plausible alternative [to the client is] that the lawyer has . . .
accept[ed] the client’s money now but [will be] betraying him later.”129
Paul R. Tremblay analogizes this situation to “ratting”130 on the ground
that the lawyer is exploiting client intimacy.131
on these particular issues far outweighs the marginal value of fairness to the exceptional
client to whom the warning would be relevant.” FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 16, §
6.09, at 172. They argue:
The lawyer cannot serve the client as he deserves to be served if she does not
know everything there is to know about the client’s case. Accordingly, the
lawyer must urge him to tell her everything, and the lawyer must pledge
confidentiality. Having given that pledge, we would be morally bound to keep
it.
Id. § 6.09, at 171. And yet, Freedman and Smith admit that there are some moral values,
such as the value of human life, or the fairness of defending oneself against formalized
charges, that “may take precedence over truthfulness” and justify breaking the lawyer’s
pledge. Id. They argue that “[i]n addition to the value at stake, the situation will occur
so infrequently as to create no systemic threat; that is, there is no significant likelihood
that the existence of this exception would make clients fearful of confiding in their
lawyers.” Id.
128. Zacharias, supra note 8, at 381.
129. Hodes, supra note 116, at 786–87. Hodes argues that
most criminals who bring in the . . . sack of stolen money to their lawyers have
some vague idea that once those items are in the lawyer’s hands, they are
forever immune from discovery. [But] [i]f a generation from now it is widely
understood that this is not true, fewer such turnovers will occur, but that is a
small price to pay for a generation of telling the truth about the legal profession.
Id. at 788 (footnote omitted). The benefits of using a “truth-in-lawyering” principle is
that clients will be told about the reality up front, and this could lead to more trust of
lawyers because “clients seeking prohibited assistance would at least be warned off
rather than betrayed later, and clients seeking legitimate help, even if at the margins,
could better understand and be more assured that they truly had the full, loyal help of
their chosen counsel.” Id. at 810–11.
130. Tremblay, supra note 104, at 82; see Michael K. McChrystal, Lawyers and
Loyalty, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 367, 406 (1992) (“[T]he limits on loyalty required by
legality can be a trap for the client, whose ignorance may encourage a reliance wider
than the loyalty that a lawyer can reasonably promise.”); see also Levin, supra note 13,
at 144 (stating the cost of a lawyer’s failure to inform a client of disclosure rules includes
“client distrust of lawyers, loss of client autonomy, and damage to lawyers’ internal
standards of integrity”); Zacharias, Harmonizing Privilege and Confidentiality, supra
note 11, at 95–96 (offering the following barrow of reasons for why it is inappropriate to
mislead clients about what can be disclosed in confidence). Zacharias states:
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Accordingly, discussion of the exceptions to confidentiality with
clients is more than a legal obligation. It is necessary to create an honest
and trusting relationship that respects the client’s human dignity.
III. EXPLAINING CONFIDENTIALITY: COMPARING THREE APPROACHES
To navigate the doctrinal, practical, and moral considerations regarding
explaining confidentiality, commentators have offered several strategies,
which we group into three approaches. The first seeks to make the
pledge of absolute confidentiality an honest one. The second offers a
general introduction to the exceptions, while the third provides a detailed
description of the bounds of lawyer-client confidentiality.
A. Promising Nondisclosure
As we noted earlier, many lawyers either fail to mention confidentiality
or pledge absolute confidentiality using language to the effect, “As you
may know, everything between us is confidential.”132 In Part II, we
explain that these approaches are false, misleading, and accordingly
inconsistent both with the rules and with a lawyer-client relationship
grounded in mutual respect and trust. Some commentators have sought
to rescue the pledge of absolute confidentiality by making it an honest
communication.
Lawrence J. Fox and Susan R. Martyn, for example, offer the concept of
“Guaranteed Confidentiality,”133 put into practice when a law firm’s
engagement letter promises never to exercise its discretion to disclose
confidential client information.134 In effect, the lawyer would agree
never to disclose under the discretionary provisions of confidentiality

At the simplest and most theoretical level, it is inconsistent with the notions
that a lawyer is a client’s agent, that clients have autonomy in asserting their
legal rights that lawyers are supposed to support, and that the lawyer’s function
is to assist the client rather than the adversary or the state. More practically, to
the extent it becomes known that lawyers’ explanations of confidentiality are
incomplete or misleading, clients increasingly will become unwilling to confide at
all. That, in turn, may have negative consequences not only for the representation,
but also for the legal system as a whole. Id. (footnotes omitted).
131. Tremblay, supra note 104, at 52.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 43–45, 52–53.
133. See LAWRENCE J. FOX & SUSAN R. MARTYN, RED FLAGS: A LAWYER’S
HANDBOOK ON LEGAL ETHICS § 5.14(b) (2005).
134. Id.; see Richard W. Painter, Toward a Market for Lawyer Disclosure Services:
In Search of Optimal Whistleblowing Rules, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221, 221 (1995)
(proposing a voluntary regime that would permit lawyers to decide and inform clients
which whistleblowing rules they will follow); Zacharias, Coercing Clients, supra note
11, at 480 (describing how lawyers and clients bargain around discretionary ethics rules).
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doctrine.135 Assuming that the rules would permit a lawyer to waive
discretion,136 this approach has the advantage of being honest, at least
with regard to the harm prevention exceptions and the discretionary
provisions of the lawyer-protection exceptions, including waiver of the
right to use confidential information in defense of a malpractice action
or in suing to recover unpaid fees.137

135. In reality, these agreements may prove popular by the fact that many lawyers
are not interested in exercising their discretion to disclose. See Zacharias, The Future
Structure and Regulation of Law Practice, supra note 11, at 848–49 (“Lawyers tend to
ignore altogether permissive rules that would permit them to avoid using evidence whose
truthfulness they doubt or which authorize, but do not require, disclosure under attorneyclient confidentiality rules. Presumably, the code drafters envisioned that lawyers would
exercise their discretion under these rules, but lawyers rarely do—in part because lawyers fear
that implementing the rules will open them up to competition from less ethical
advocates.” (footnotes omitted)).
136. FOX & MARTYN, supra note 133, § 5.14(b). Zacharias contributed insightful
scholarship to this issue. He argued that the ability of lawyers to contract around
confidentiality rules is dependent not upon whether the rule leaves conduct up to the
lawyer’s discretion, but rather whether the underlying purpose of the rule is to benefit a
nonclient interest. Zacharias, Integrity Ethics, supra note 11, at 586–87. He classified
professional rules as either rules of role or rules of integrity. Rules of role are created to
emphasize “the lawyer’s obligations to protect clients’ rights” and define the lawyer’s
role in the legal system. Id. at 553. Rules of integrity are created to impose “societallyimposed legal requirements” or allow room for other moral considerations. Id. at 554.
For role rules, Zacharias argued: “To the extent a client wishes contractually to limit the
ways in which a lawyer acts in the client’s interests, autonomy and market considerations
should allow the client to do so.” Id. at 586. For integrity rules, lawyers should not be
allowed to contract around mandated duties. Id. The problem of Model Rule 1.6(b) is
really that it could be classified as either a role rule or an integrity rule. Id. at 564–65.
To the extent that the purpose of a confidentiality exception is “to protect non-client
interests,” Zacharias believed “clients should not be able to assume control over those
interests by paying lawyers for that right.” Id. at 587.
Zacharias also predicted that certain clients who really value confidentiality may seek
out lawyers willing to make nondisclosure agreements and those lawyers could
conceivably charge premiums for that benefit. See Zacharias, Coercing Clients, supra
note 11, at 480 (describing the effects when lawyers and clients bargain around discretionary
ethics rules). Consequently, “individual clients of limited means will fear that they have
not committed enough resources to assure adequate performance and loyalty by the
lawyer.” Zacharias, Limited Performance Agreements, supra note 11, at 931.
137. See Pizzimenti, supra note 98, at 489. A discussion about certain confidentiality
exceptions left up to discretion may be unnecessary when the lawyer prospectively
decides not to disclose confidential information. Freedman and Smith state they could
never justify breaching confidentiality to collect a lawyer fee, even if it is permitted by
Model Rule 1.6(b)(2). FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 16, § 6.09, at 172 n.55. They
also emphasize, with regard to the lawyer protection exception for establishing a defense
against charges and claims, that “although the lawyer is not required to be heroic by
remaining silent, she is permitted to do so.” Id. § 5.11, at 155 n.143. A similarly minded
lawyer may feel comfortable entering a nondisclosure agreement about these exceptions.
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But to make this pledge completely accurate and to create a
foundation for a relationship of trust and respect, the lawyer would have
to go even further. Following the lead of Monroe H. Freedman and
Abbe Smith,138 the lawyer would have to agree not to disclose even
when required to do so under the mandatory provisions of the fraud on
the court and lawyer-protection exceptions. Although this pledge makes
the lawyer’s commitment a truthful one, it suffers from an insoluble
vulnerability. The mandatory provisions, such as the requirement to
disclose fraud on the court, are legal requirements. The lawyer would
have to agree to face civil and criminal sanctions in order to make the
lawyer’s promise a genuine one.139 Moreover, given that an agreement
to violate the law is unenforceable, to be truthful the lawyer would still
have to inform the client that if the lawyer were to change her mind
about complying with a mandatory disclosure, for example when facing
a sentence for contempt, the client could not enforce the agreement not
to disclose.140
B. General Explanations
Commentators have offered different approaches to explaining
confidentiality that rely on a general identification of exceptions to
confidentiality.
Stefan H. Krieger and Richard K. Neumann, Jr. recommend that in
initial interviews, lawyers should tell clients: “Before we go further, I
should explain that the law requires me to keep confidential what you
tell me. There are some exceptions, some situations where I may or
must tell someone else something you tell me, but for the most part I am
not allowed to tell anybody.”141 If clients have questions about what the
exceptions are, the lawyer should explain them.142 Otherwise, Krieger

138. Freedman and Smith argue that the adversary system is already designed to
take into account the situation of client perjury, via cross-examination. FREEDMAN & SMITH,
supra note 16, § 6.09, at 172. There is also the condemned possibility of the lawyer
engaging in intentional ignorance or refraining from calling the witness. See id. § 6.15,
at 179; id. § 6.21, at 193.
139. See Pizzimenti, supra note 98, at 489 & n.218 (describing how a lawyer may
decide “as a matter of personal ethics” not to disclose a client’s perjury, “but she thereby
runs the risk of violating an ethics rule and subjecting herself to discipline”). Freedman
and Smith note that there is no easy solution to the ethical dilemma of dealing with client
perjury; they even “acknowledge that [they] are less than completely satisfied with
[their] own position.” FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 16, § 6.22, at 193.
140. See McChrystal, supra note 130, at 408–09; Zacharias, supra note 8, at 368.
141. STEFAN H. KRIEGER & RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., ESSENTIAL LAWYERING
SKILLS: INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, NEGOTIATION, AND PERSUASIVE FACT ANALYSIS 89
(2d ed. 2003).
142. Id.
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and Neumann conclude that most clients do not want to hear a lecture on
all the exceptions at the start of the representation.143 This approach puts
the onus on the client to request more information that might be relevant
about the lawyer’s representation.144
This type of strategy is similar to the approach offered by David A.
Binder, Paul Bergman, Susan C. Price, and Paul R. Tremblay in Lawyers
as Counselors: A Client-Centered Approach,145 the leading text on client
counseling. It suggests that lawyers should discuss confidentiality
generally at the outset of representation but also qualify it in a way, such
as, “Now, there are some narrow exceptions to the confidentiality rules.
It’s unlikely you’ll have to be concerned about them, but if at some point
I have any worries along those lines I’ll let you know.”146 In follow-up,
the text recommends that the lawyer ask the client if there are any
questions about confidentiality.147 When clients are “reluctant” to share
information, Binder and his colleagues suggest reiterating the lawyer’s
commitment to confidentiality.148 They recommend that lawyers tell
their clients: “Remember, unless you tell me you’re planning to rob a
bank or something like that, everything you tell me is confidential. I
cannot and will not divulge anything you say without your express
permission.”149

143. Id.
144. The duty to request more information that a client may find relevant can just as
easily be made to fall upon the lawyer, as a duty to provide relevant information. In an
article entitled Lawyers and Loyalty, Michael K. McChrystal offers:
A lawyer can generally satisfy the duty to advise by instructing the client that
the lawyer must operate within the strict limits of the law in representing a
client. In many circumstances, even this sort of warning may be unnecessary
because of the unlikelihood that a misunderstanding will occur. The client’s
foreseeable reliance on the lawyer’s agreement to be loyal imposes on the
lawyer a duty to clarify the scope of that agreement when misunderstandings
are likely to occur.
McChrystal, supra note 130, at 406. It is puzzling how the lawyer is to know that a
client’s misunderstanding about unspoken exceptions is reasonably foreseeable and
relied upon by a client. Id.
145. See DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED
APPROACH (2d ed. 2004).
146. Id. at 106; see Kruse, supra note 109, at 128 (describing the popularity of the
client-centered approach to counseling in clinical legal education and its particular
application to representing the poor or other marginalized clients, although the approach
has been “slow to catch on in legal ethics”).
147. BINDER ET AL., supra note 145, at 106; see supra note 144.
148. BINDER ET AL., supra note 145, at 241.
149. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Although this client-centered approach strives for honesty and trust
between lawyer and client, it fails to do so. First, the lawyer is the
primary gatekeeper for discussion of confidentiality exceptions. Even
while permitting the client to ask questions, the lawyer seeks to
discourage such questions. In doing so, the approach implicitly views
clients as scared, confused, and timid individuals who need reassurance
of confidentiality. Further illustrating this paternalistic view are the
strategy of using confidentiality to cajole sharing information and the
humorous reference to the bank robbery, which implies that the
confidentiality exceptions are too difficult for the client to handle.
Second, the strategy of informing the client of the particular exceptions
only when the lawyer deems them relevant is not a particularly effective
one. Absent a conversation regarding specific exceptions, the lawyer
will not have the benefit of the client’s views on confidentiality and
disclosure.
A better approach would be an honest discussion between lawyer and
client about each other’s interests and concerns about confidentiality,
beginning from the first conversation between lawyer and client.
Katherine Kruse has criticized Binder’s approach to client-centered
lawyering in the following way:
[T]he client-centered approach to problem solving can obscure important factors
such as the client’s personal connections and responsibilities toward others; the
larger context of the systems within which the client operates; and the connections
between the client’s individual problems and the social justice issues at stake in
the representation.150

Furthermore, Kruse observes that discussing exceptions only as they
become relevant essentially limits “lawyer intervention to a strategy of
last resort[.] [T]he client-centered approach misses the opportunity to
theorize the more subtle, interactive, collaborative and client-empowering
interventions that have arisen in its wake.”151
Kruse has joined with her coauthors of another leading counseling
text—Stephen Ellmann, Robert D. Dinerstein, Isabelle R. Gunning, and
Ann C. Shalleck—to propose an alternative client-centered perspective
that also relies on a general approach to confidentiality exceptions. At
the very beginning of the lawyer-client relationship, they propose a
typical discussion that may start like this:
For me to understand your case and figure out whether I can help you, I need
to know the facts. The law realizes this and realizes that it is important for you
to be able to speak to me fully and frankly. For that reason, ordinarily everything

150. Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The Plural Values of Client-Centered
Representation, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 369, 392 (2006).
151. Id. at 399.
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you tell me is confidential. That means I won’t, and can’t, repeat it without your
consent.152

Like the traditional client-centered approach, the emphasis is on building
trust. The authors also recommend that the lawyer explain that there are
exceptions to confidentiality without going into those exceptions in great
detail. They suggest that the lawyer continue with the following
language:
Now, you should know that this rule, like most rules, has some exceptions, and
if it turns out to be necessary as we go along I will explain these to you in detail.
But normally, as I’ve already said, what you tell me—even about things that
may be embarrassing or even illegal—is confidential. That lets us talk frankly,
which is what we need to do, and that’s what I’d like to begin doing now.153

The authors contend that this language is accurate because it does not
assert absolute confidentiality and clear because it avoids unnecessary
details of specific exceptions that could confuse or scare the client.154
This approach recommends delaying discussion of specific exceptions
until they become relevant. “[W]hen a confidentiality exception is in
view,” the lawyer should explain it.155 Without such an explanation,
“the lawyer may not only betray the client but do so behind his back.”156
Thus, lawyers should wait to talk about confidentiality limits until “those
limits are really at issue in a particular case.”157 The lawyer should
make every effort to try to discuss the relevant confidentiality exception
before the disclosure becomes necessary but not without—or possibly
before—having a dialogue about the client’s conduct that prompts
possible disclosure.158 This approach acknowledges the risk that a
client, upon hearing that there is an applicable limit to confidentiality,
may become tightlipped and that the lawyer could unknowingly assist
the client in perpetrating a crime or fraud.159 The authors concede that
152. ELLMANN ET AL., supra note 58, at 251.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 252–53 (providing an example that frames the discussion as the lawyer’s
right to reveal the client’s communications to the authorities).
156. Id. at 252.
157. Id. at 247 n.70.
158. See id. at 252; see also Zacharias, Professional Responsibility, supra note 11,
at 915 (“[L]awyers should question client objectives, both for the clients’ sakes and for
the greater good. When appropriate . . . lawyers should engage in a moral dialogue with
clients designed to encourage clients to take appropriate action even when that action
may not maximize the clients’ financial interests.” (footnote omitted)).
159. ELLMANN ET AL., supra note 58, at 252–53.
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this strategy would “perhaps selfishly protect the lawyer from facing a
moral dilemma that needs to be faced.”160 Despite this potential, the
authors argue that this approach will “deepen the encounter between
lawyer and client” when the advice regarding the relevant confidentiality
exception leads to a dialogue that enlightens the client and steers him
away from the misconduct.161
Waiting to discuss confidentiality exceptions until they become
relevant ensures that clients are not overloaded with too much information
that emphasizes lawyer loyalties to nonclient interests. The approach
has the benefit of being accurate, honest, and ensuring client trust from
the beginning of the relationship. Eli Wald argues that “a materialitybased communications rule [can] play a critical gatekeeper role
guaranteeing that clients receive essential information necessary for their
informed participation in the relationship,” but properly defining the
standard of materiality and the communication’s timing is significant.162
Although “a fact should not be deemed material simply because a client
might consider it important,” the proper standard for materiality “would
ensure that clients receive all information a reasonable client would
consider relevant for his decision regarding the objectives of the
Wald proposes the following addition to the
relationship.”163
commentary of Model Rule 1.4 dealing with client’s informed
decisionmaking:
[G]eneral observations about how a lawyer may exercise her discretion about
exceptions to confidentiality (a “Miranda” warning) are not ordinarily material.
However, if developments in the representation lead the lawyer to entertain
disclosure of confidential client information, then whether and how the lawyer
plans to exercise her discretion to reveal confidential client information becomes
material and must be communicated to the client promptly.164

The approach to explaining confidentiality propounded by Ellmann,
Kruse, and their colleagues, as well as Wald, does not appear to sidestep
many of the problems plaguing the traditional client-centered approach.
The difference between when confidentiality exceptions become
“relevant” versus “really at issue” or “material” to a client, through the
eyes of the lawyer, seems semantic. And just because this approach
recommends an explanation occur before the disclosure becomes
necessary does not mean it avoids the problem of the lawyer alone
interpreting when a discussion about relevant confidentiality exceptions
become a necessity. Lawyers still function as the gatekeeper for a more
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
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See Wald, supra note 117, at 780–85.
See id. at 782, 790.
Id. at 791.
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detailed conversation about confidentiality exceptions. The approach
relies on lawyers recognizing certain client cues and anticipating a
moment when confidentiality exceptions should be explained.
This approach is also problematic because clients must rely on a
general explanation of confidentiality at the time when they are making
a choice about whether to retain a lawyer. Clients would not have all
potentially relevant information about limitations of the representation at
the time they decide to hire a particular lawyer.165 Furthermore, by
foregoing an honest discussion about confidentiality up front, lawyers
are presuming that upon hearing about confidentiality exceptions, clients
would decide it is not in their interest to confide. Whether this is true or
not, and the limited empirical evidence that exists seems to deflate this
presumption, clients deserve to know the basic limitations on
confidentiality when they are choosing a lawyer for representation.
C. Specific Explanations
Some commentators propose that lawyers explain the confidentiality
exceptions in detail at the outset of the lawyer-client relationship. They
emphasize the importance of the lawyer’s obligation to respect the
client’s dignity and empower the client to make informed decisions
based on accurate information.166 They assert that the failure to explain
confidentiality fully at the beginning of the lawyer-client relationship “is
morally problematic because it involves professionals trying to build and
encourage trust and then using it to deceive.”167
Pizzimenti proposes that lawyers should explain confidentiality to
their clients by first giving a general explanation of confidentiality and
covering its major exceptions so that “the client will have enough
information to enable him to ask intelligent questions as specific
confidentiality issues arise.”168 She believes that this will open up a
“continuing dialogue” because “honesty about the limits of confidentiality
will [likely] increase trust.”169
Pizzimenti also advocates that when “it becomes clear to the attorney
as the representation progresses that the client needs more specific
165.
166.

See Pizzimenti, supra note 98, at 476; Sobelson, supra note 20, at 711.
See ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR. ET AL., THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW: A COLLABORATIVE
APPROACH TO CLIENT INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING § 4-6(a)(1) (2d ed. 2006).
167. Pizzimenti, supra note 98, at 477.
168. Id. at 485.
169. Id. at 485 n.200.
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information because an exception may apply, she should raise the issue
again.”170 She outlines several factors that are helpful for the lawyer to
determine if the exception would be material to the client’s situation: the
client’s relative sophistication, how likely the information within an
exception would be confided, and the character of potential confidences.171
However, Pizzimenti believes that none of these factors are dispositive
and, in fact, use of the factors runs the risk of suggesting selective
disclosure is appropriate or that a client’s needs can be standardized and
depersonalized.172 Ultimately, materiality should be decided on an
individual basis, and the lawyer should “engage the client in an ongoing,
personal discussion to enable her to determine what matters to the
client.”173
Still, Pizzimenti anticipates that lawyers will have a “carefully worded
speech” prepared at the outset of the relationship.174 She offers the
following model approach:
You should know that I work for you and that I consider it very important to
keep your confidences. The attorney-client privilege essentially means that I cannot
be forced to disclose information about discussions we have. For example,
judges sometimes can order lawyers to disclose information, but they can’t
make me tell them about whether you committed the crime [or acted negligently
or breached the contract, et cetera]. You should know about some limits to the
privilege, however. If I learn that you will lie or have lied on the witness stand,
I must report that. I am also allowed to report if you tell me you are going to
commit a crime. I may also report limited information to defend against claims
made against me or to collect my fee, but I am allowed to report only that
information necessary to meet those goals. For example, if we fight about my
fee, I might be able to show my billing records, but I couldn’t just reveal all the
things I know about you. Although there are times I may feel it is necessary to
report information, I want to remind you that I take the privilege very seriously
and would never lightly decide to share information.175

Pizzimenti’s model is markedly different from the client-centered
counseling approaches. Although the lawyer has a continuing obligation
to explore confidentiality exceptions as they become relevant, the client
already has obtained a basic knowledge that allows the client to
participate in an ongoing dialogue with the lawyer. The lawyer provides
information the client needs to make decisions regarding whether to
retain the lawyer and how to interact with the lawyer.176 Pizzimenti

170. Id. at 485.
171. Id. at 485–87.
172. Id. at 487.
173. Id. at 488.
174. See id. at 487.
175. Id. at 488–89.
176. Id. at 489 (“The final question is what consequences a failure to inform of
exceptions should have. If a client does not have information reasonably necessary to
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argues that if there is concern about the consequences of such a detailed
explanation of confidentiality on the client’s candor, then the ethical
rules should be changed; as “long as [confidentiality exceptions] exist,
however, the client should be aware of them.”177
Sobelson’s approach is even more comprehensive. Hoping to perfect
an explanation that is both accurate and not “so complicated and
frightening that it unduly chills the open and honest exchange of
information,” Sobelson proposes that a written explanation should be
given to clients before the first interview and that clients should be given
an opportunity to read and sign a form indicating their understanding of
its terms.178 He proposes covering approximately fifteen exceptions to

make informed decisions, the lawyer has violated Model Rule 1.4(b) and should be subject to
discipline.”).
177. Id.
178. See Sobelson, supra note 20, at 772; see also COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 166,
§ 4-6(a)(1) (proposing that written, full explanations about confidentiality and fees
should be given to clients before the initial interview, which would be a “more efficient
manner than a mini-lecture at the beginning of the interview, when the client may not be
listening intently”). Cochran and his colleagues propose accompanying the written
explanation with a short verbal explanation at the first client interview, such as:
Before we get started, let me talk about those papers you received in the
waiting room. One paper describes what lawyers call the rules on confidentiality.
That generally means that I cannot tell anyone what we talk about unless you
give me permission, but that paper explains some of the exceptions to the rule.
Id. § 4-7.
At least one practice area of law makes use of this approach. The American Academy
of Matrimonial Lawyers has published Divorce Manual: A Client Handbook, which is
posted on its website. See AM. ACAD. OF MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS, DIVORCE MANUAL: A
CLIENT HANDBOOK (2010), available at http://www.aaml.org/library/publications/415/divorcemanual-client-handbook. The Divorce Manual advises clients:
One of a lawyer’s most fundamental ethical obligations is to maintain the
confidentiality of client communications.
....
There are also several exceptions to your lawyer’s duty not to reveal client
confidences. A conversation in which a client tells a lawyer that the client
intends to commit a crime or, in some states, a fraud, is not privileged and the
lawyer could be forced to testify in court about the conversation. The privilege
may also be lost if you or one of your witnesses commits perjury and in other
circumstances which you should discuss with your lawyer. Also, if a lawyer is
accused of wrongdoing by the client, the lawyer may reveal confidential
information necessary to defend against the accusation.
Id. at ch. 10. In very basic terms, the Divorce Manual covers each of the three categories
of confidentiality exceptions that are discussed, supra, in Part II.
Levin’s study surveying New Jersey lawyers also showed that those “who practiced a
substantial amount of family law were somewhat more likely to tell their clients of the
[state’s mandatory-harm-prevention exception] at the first substantive meeting than
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confidentiality, including the fact and terms of the relationship,
information conveyed for purposes other than obtaining legal advice,
and communications made for the purposes of having the lawyer
participate or aid in criminal, fraudulent, or wrongful activity.179
Sobelson also proposes explaining the limits of confidentiality in a way
that closely tracks the language of the ethical rules governing lawyers.
For example, his model consent form reads:
Despite my obligations of confidentiality, I may be FORCED to reveal information
under the following circumstances:
(a) If a court orders me to;
(b) If certain laws require me to;
(c) If you intend to commit a crime or fraud in the future;
(d) If you commit a fraud, such as perjury, while I am your lawyer.180

Although this approach gives clients the most thorough explanation of
confidentiality when they are making a decision about retaining a
lawyer, it has also received criticism. Ellmann and his colleagues argue
that Sobelson’s proposal is so detailed that it could confuse clients.
They assert:
There is little point in raising issues that are very unlikely to bear on a client’s
case. In fact, there is a good reason not to provide such extraneous information:
the lawyer’s job is to provide expert information in clear fashion to a layperson,
not to turn that layperson into a lawyer. Too much information can confuse rather
than enlighten.181

Most matters will not implicate particular confidentiality exceptions.182
Moreover, “[e]ven if a lawyer makes a good faith effort to explain the
rules to clients, the clients are likely to remain confused at least as to
lawyers in other practice areas.” Levin, supra note 13, at 124 n.194. She hypothesized
that family law practitioners probably anticipate that the subject of client wrongdoing
could be raised with seriousness during the relationship, and although criminal defense
lawyers have reason to share in this anticipation, they may be more concerned with “the
immediate need to establish trust in order to obtain information.” Id.
179. See Sobelson, supra note 20, at 772–73.
180. See id. at 773. Sobelson’s form was drafted based on the 1969 Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, and under modern Model Rules of Professional Conduct it
would look slightly different. For example, he does not address the harm prevention
exception, which, of course, would also vary between jurisdictions. Sobelson also
proposes addressing the possibility of a legal malpractice suit or a fee collection suit, in
which case the lawyer “may reveal information to the extent necessary to defend or
otherwise protect [the lawyer].” See id.
181. See ELLMANN ET AL., supra note 58, at 246; see also Pizzimenti, supra note 98,
at 485 (criticizing an explanation that is too detailed as “unnecessary” and “counterproductive”
because the client does not need “an equivalent of a law school education”).
182. For example, Ellmann and his colleagues point out that “it does seem safe to
say that [Sobelson’s] form offers advice that, in many respects, most clients would not
need (most clients, for example, probably have no reason to want to keep their own
identity secret).” ELLMANN ET AL., supra note 58, at 247–48; see Zacharias, Harmonizing
Privilege and Confidentiality, supra note 11, at 108 & n.184.
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details,” especially where aspects of confidentiality and its exceptions
are ambiguous or colored by sources other than lawyers—television,
literature, friends—that do not account for specific jurisdictional
codes.183
In response, Sobelson emphasizes the lawyer’s duty to inform the
client of important limitations. He argues: “The fact that the information
is complicated or frightening is no excuse for hiding it.”184 A less
detailed explanation of confidentiality could cause the client to share
“information he has the absolute right to keep secret.”185 Sobelson
asserts that “[a] client has a right to decide that some information is so
sensitive that he does not wish to entrust it to a lawyer who will reveal
it.”186 Nonetheless, even Sobelson’s form is not exhaustive because it
does not delineate the specific details of every possible confidentiality
exception.187
Another concern is that when they understand the confidentiality
exceptions, some clients may choose to end the lawyer-client relationship or
choose to continue it but lie to their lawyers.188 Sobelson argues that this
happens already when a client fears a loss of respect from the lawyer if
the client were to reveal his true motives or purposes.189 Moreover, the
concern regarding how clients would behave if they understood the law
would seem to apply as well to the approach of providing a general
explanation in advance and a specific explanation when it becomes
relevant. Furthermore, Sobelson argues that if all lawyers were to
comply with a thorough explanation of confidentiality, shopping around
for lawyers who do not explain confidentiality exceptions would become
futile.190

183. Zacharias, supra note 8, at 365–66 (“As a practical matter, clients thus probably
end up with only a general understanding that attorney-client conversations usually remain
confidential but occasionally may be revealed.”).
184. Sobelson, supra note 20, at 774.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. ELLMANN ET AL., supra note 58, at 247. Compare Sobelson, supra note 20, at
772–73 (discussing at least fifteen exceptions to confidentiality worth explaining to a
client), with Rothstein, supra note 20, at 1754–61 (offering a list of twenty-five exceptions
that may be important for a client to know).
188. ELLMANN ET AL., supra note 58, at 248; Hodes, supra note 116, at 787; Rothstein,
supra note 20, at 1764, 1766.
189. Sobelson, supra note 20, at 774.
190. Id.
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IV. CONFIDENTIALITY EXPLAINED: A DIALOGUE APPROACH
We propose a fourth alternative. Lawyers should explain confidentiality
in a way that combines a general explanation of confidentiality with
specific identification of the three categorical exceptions, while at the
same time encouraging dialogue regarding the exceptions. We urge
lawyers to address their mistrust of clients and their fear of clients’
mistrust through honesty and dialogue.
In an initial consultation, a lawyer could explain confidentiality with
language similar to the following:
I want you to know that I have an ethical obligation to maintain the confidentiality of
information you share with me. I will not disclose this information unless you
give me authorization or the law authorizes disclosure. The law authorizes
disclosure in very few circumstances—to prevent serious bodily or financial
harm to others, to prevent fraud on the court, and to protect my interests in very
rare instances, such as if you were to sue me for malpractice or I were to
sue you to collect fees. Even then, I could only disclose the information to the
extent necessary. Do you have any questions about my obligation to keep your
information confidential? If you have any questions about confidentiality at any
point during our relationship, please let me know. We can talk about this again
at any time. You should also know that if I feel we need to discuss these issues
again, I will let you know. I want our relationship to be a two-way street.

This approach is direct and honest. It explains the confidentiality
exceptions in a framework that encourages dialogue and demonstrates
the lawyer’s honesty and commitment to a mutual relationship. This
dialogue approach treats clients as three-dimensional individuals who
are able to process information and make their own decisions about what
they value and not as the stereotypes that Kruse describes as a
“cardboard” client.191
The dialogue approach offers significant advantages in comparison to
a detailed explanation of exceptions, whether oral or in writing.192 Both
a lengthy oral explanation and a written form discourage dialogue. They
imply that the explanation itself is the goal, as opposed to a conversation
between lawyer and client. In addition, a detailed list of exceptions may
overwhelm clients. By identifying the three categories of exceptions in
nonlegal language, our approach seeks to strike a balance between
providing sufficient information for the client to participate knowledgeably
in the lawyer-client relationship without providing so much information
that the client is overwhelmed.

191. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 181–83 (describing criticism of Sobelson’s
approach).
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The dialogue approach also offers advantages over the general
explanations of confidentiality.193 The lawyer provides the client with
enough information to ask further questions at the time of the initial
client interview or in the future when either lawyer or client determines
that the question is relevant.194 In contrast, the approaches favored in the
client counseling textbooks195 make the lawyer the primary gatekeeper
for future discussions. As Eli Wald cautions, lawyers too easily slip into
a “one-way street” that neglects a client’s cares, fears, needs, or
values.196 Even a lawyer who is adept at identifying cues can never fully
know what bears on the client’s interest. Like Pizzimenti, we believe
that it is important to give clients enough information to enable them to
ask intelligent questions about confidentiality and participate
meaningfully in lawyer-client relationships.197
By encouraging dialogue, our proposal minimizes the danger that
clients will use this information to lie to their lawyer. The lawyer’s
willingness to share information on confidentiality exceptions at the
commencement of the relationship indicates that the lawyer trusts and
respects the client. The lawyer’s honesty and commitment to dialogue
maximizes the chance that the client will trust the lawyer and honestly
share information. Last, the available empirical evidence, such as Fred
Zacharias’s pathbreaking work, indicates that knowledge of exceptions
is not likely to dissuade clients from providing confidential information
to their lawyers.

193. This language was purposely selected in response to Wald’s well-argued concept
that “the Rules design a communications regime that is intentionally a one-way street”
resulting in an “inherent asymmetric gap in information between lawyers and clients.”
Wald, supra note 117, at 757. By example, Wald illustrates how the doctrine of confidentiality
encourages clients to reveal all facts to their lawyers by ensuring that their information
will be protected, although lawyers are not encouraged to reveal “how [they] plan[] on
exercising . . . professional judgment and discretion in revealing confidential client information.”
See id. at 755–59.
194. But see id. at 791 (noting that “general observations about how a lawyer may
exercise her discretion about exceptions to confidentiality (a ‘Miranda’ warning) are not
ordinarily material” until “developments in the representation lead the lawyer to entertain
disclosure of confidential client information”).
195. See supra Part III.B.
196. See supra note 193.
197. See supra notes 168–69 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
We offer the dialogue approach to explaining confidentiality as a way
for lawyers to begin a dialogue with their clients and to develop
relationships of mutual respect and trust with their clients. We remain
mindful of Cunningham’s caution that “the four words ‘How To Explain
Confidentiality’ need to have a question mark rather than a colon at the
end of them; this phrase should be treated as a profoundly difficult
question rather than as the title of a set of ‘how to’ directions for talking
with clients.”198 By creating a framework for ongoing dialogue, we have
sought to avoid Cunningham’s trap of “‘how to’ directions” for explaining
confidentiality or Wald’s concern regarding a Miranda warning.199
Nevertheless, a model offers a helpful starting point. Our proposal seeks
to provide lawyers with a useful tool for fulfilling their professional
responsibilities and to generate further conversation within the legal
profession. And we also seek to honor the memory of Fred Zacharias,
an outstanding scholar who inspires us with his unwavering commitment
to the dignity of clients and the search for truth.

198. Cunningham, supra note 12, at 615–16. Levin arrived at a similar conclusion,
after conducting her empirical research:
It is easy to say that clients should be told about this confidentiality exception,
but much more difficult to decide who should learn of the rule and to devise a
palatable and meaningful way to tell clients. In theory, all clients should be told
explicitly about the disclosure rule because all are entitled to know the rules that
govern their communications with their lawyers. As a practical matter, such a
requirement could confuse many clients and seriously interfere with the development
of client trust, thereby affecting lawyers’ ability to represent their clients.
See Levin, supra note 13, at 145–46 (footnote omitted).
199. See supra note 193.
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